What If Gordon Banks Had Played, Part 6
“For God's sake bring me a large Scotch. What a bloody awful country.” — Reginald Maudling
From “Making Sense of the Troubles”, J. McCrittrick (Blackstaff, 1999)
The announcement of the abolition of Special Category Status for terrorist prisoners was hardly a surprise. In fact it was more of a surprise that it took so long. Callaghan's decision to introduce Special Status in June 1972 had been staunchly opposed by both Powell and the Ulster Unionists and with a Ulster Unionist Secretary of State for Northern Ireland the question is more why it took so long for Molyneaux to take action. One can only surmise that the Powell Government, beleaguered by union militancy and rising unemployment felt it had enough on its plate already, and it was not until May 1975 that it felt secure enough to provoke the renewed crisis that the abolition of Special Status would inevitably provoke.
Special Status allowed IRA and other paramilitary prisoners to wear civilian clothes, associate freely with other IRA prisoners and excluded them from prison work. They were also allowed to elect block commanders who were de facto allowed to represent prisoners in dealings with the prison authorities. Molyneaux announced that paramilitary prisoners were to treated as ordinary criminals, forfeiting all these privileges. The new regulations were to apply to all prisoners, including those sentenced under the old arrangements.
The IRA prisoners in Long Kesh refused to wear prison uniforms or follow prison regulations, instead taking to wearing blankets, this formed the beginning of a dirty protest. Simultaneously relatives of IRA prisoners instigated a case in the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that conditions within the prison were inhuman. The ECHR case was immediately dismissed by the Government. In a terse statement the Prime Minister's office pointed out that the ECHR had no power to enforce its rulings and any ruling against the British Government would be ignored.
In July 1975 the IRA issued a statement stating they would henceforth consider prison officers as legitimate targets. The dirty protest within Long Kesh continued through the Summer; in August the ECHR issued its ruling, finding against the plaintiffs, but criticising the British Government for its intransigence. The Government's response was, in so many words, “push off.” Finally, on the 4th October 1975, four IRA prisoners announced their intention to go on hunger strike, starving themselves, to death if necessary, until political status was reinstated.
The hunger strike marked a turning point in Northern Irish politics. Prior to 1975 the UK government had attempted to negotiate with the IRA behind the scenes, a policy that had resulted in such failed attempts as the Sunningdale agreement and had led to such concessions as special status while there had been no decrease in the level of violence. The trail of events that the hunger strike set in motion would see the UK Government move to a position of outright determination to destroy the IRA and crush its supporters.
Letter to all UK newspaper and television editors, 7th October 1975
Since the re-emergence of the troubles in Northern Ireland, quite properly many articles have been published and broadcasts been made reporting the activities of the IRA and speculating about potential and imminent action against the terrorists. There has also been speculation about intelligence and security activities and intentions. What has gone out so far has included comparatively little not already in the public domain, and the spirit of the advice in the D-Notices has largely been observed.
However, as you will be aware, the IRA are increasingly pursuing strategies aimed primarily at portraying themselves as victims of the British security forces. The simple reporting of IRA activities aimed at gaining publicity (such as the recently announced hunger strikes) is itself undermining the security operation in Northern Ireland. I am therefore circulating updated D-Notices. I should like to draw special attention to the new clauses on the reporting of activities by terrorist organisations likely to undermine security operations.
There will of course continue to be some military matters, and even very occasionally some security matters, which should be reported as events unfold. I am constantly available to advise whenever you or your staff feel that you may be getting into the sensitive areas outlined in the D-Notices
Sir Louis Le Bailly
Vice Admiral
Secretary,
Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee
7th October 1975
“Questions to the Prime Minister!” yelled Speaker Irvine over the noise of Members taking their seats.
“Number 1, Mr Speaker” came the first cry, as some non-descript labour backbencher popped up on the opposite side of the chamber.
Powell fingered the sides of the despatch box. Many previous occupants of his role had lived in fear of PMQs. Macmillan had vomited in terror prior to facing the House. Powell revelled in it. “I have had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others, later I will continue to do the same.”
“The Prime Minister has made great play of his intention to fight inflation,” the backbencher began. Powell couldn't recall his name. Evans? Madden? “...and to that effect the Chancellor has forced a pay freeze upon public sector workers up and down the country.” A grumble of discontent passed along the Opposition benches. “However, Mr Speaker, we are now pleased to see that the new Secretary of State for Industry has promised to increase pay in line with inflation next year. Does this mean, Mr Speaker, that the Prime Minister has abandoned his policy of fighting inflation?”
Powell grasped the despatch box. “It is high time, Mr Speaker, that we brought an end to the myth that wage increases lead to inflation. It is a nonsense. Inflation comes from a lack of control over the money supply. If I were to announce that I was printing an extra million pounds to pay the miners then, yes, that would be inflationary. That is not the case. We will be funding the wage rises through existing tax income.”
“Mr Dennis Healey!” The Leader of the Opposition rose to the despatch box, to cries of “Oh my God, what's that on his forehead?”, and “They're eating his face!” from wags on the Tory benches.
“Mr Speaker,” began Healey. “It is now well over a year since this Government came to power. In that year we have seen families driven to wall through a pay freeze, we have seen Britain go through the misery of a general strike — cold nights without heating or electricity. We have seen the Government sell this country's assets just to make ends meet. And what do we have to show for it?” Healey stared up at the silent Conservative benches. “What do we have to show for it? Inflation is up! Unemployment is up! Growth is down! How long do we have to wait until this Government delivers?”
Powell rose once again. “Mr Speaker. I congratulate the Leader of the Opposition on his agitprop, I am sure that it will read well in the papers. The harsh economic reality it that it will take time to correct the mistakes of the past, one cannot turn an oil tanker round on a silver penny, neither can one turn an economy round. It will take time to cure the ills that previous Governments have laid upon this country and I would hope for this House's patience.”
Healey continued. “Patience would be all very well, Mr Speaker, if the Government were headed in the right direction. But they are not! Despite the Prime Minister's reassuring words, inflation is not falling, it is still rising. Unemployment is still rising. Growth is still falling. At what point will the Prime Minister admit he has made a mistake.”
Powell winced as he rose to answer. “Mr Speaker. I will admit I have made a mistake when I do. growth in the economy will increase as we lift the burden of regulation in our economy, act to prevent the scourge of union power that has held back British companies for so long and cut taxes on our businesses. Inflation will decrease as we take action to control the money supply, which has been allowed to expand in an uncontrolled and profligate manner by my predecessors — predecessors that the Leader of the Opposition served under. As for unemployment, unemployment is a price worth paying in the fight against inflation.” There was a sharp intake of breath from the Labour benches, followed by a roar of anger. As the noise subsided there were nervous murmurs from the Tory benches.
“Mr Kevin McNamara!”
“Number 2, Mr Speaker.”
“I refer the honourable gentleman to the answer I gave some moments earlier.”
“Mr Speaker, is the Prime Minister aware that four inmates of Long Kesh prison are currently on hunger strike over prison conditions? Will he accept the need to talk to these people and accommodate the needs of the nationalist community in finding a peaceful solution to the Northern Ireland situation, will he listen to the criticisms made my the European court of Human Rights and will he act to save the lives of these four men, rather than stand back and watch them die for the sake of some prison uniforms?”
Powell sprang to his feet and glared violently at McNamara. “Her Majesty's Government will not be blackmailed by convicted murderers. This is an internal matter for the prison service and will be dealt with as such. The Government will not be talking to, negotiating with or recognising criminal organisations such as the IRA.”
“Mr John Biggs-Davison.”
On the back row of the Government benches the Chair of the 1922 Committee lumbered to his feet. “Does the Prime Minister agree that discussing this matter only gives publicity to this organisation, and that this country would be better served if some of those on the benches opposite would stop giving the IRA the publicity and legitimacy it so craves?”
“I have made the Government's position crystal clear. It will not move and is not open to discussion. My honourable friend is entirely correct. There is no further point discussing this issue.”
“Mr Michael Ancram.”
“Will the Prime Minister assure us that, in the wake of the Labour Party Conference's vote to abolish private education, he will continue to support the right of parents to make a free choice in how to educate their children?” Powell gave brief answer, giving the inevitable affirmative answer and knowing the Labour Party. He disliked such questions, but they were par for the course.
“Mr Tam Dalyell”
“Number three, Mr Speaker.” A question tabled in advance, in regard of Amery's assassination. Powell glanced down at the order paper.
“Mr Speaker, aside from the normal activities of the Parliamentary press lobby, there was no contact with the media over their reporting of Julian Amery's assassination. Neither was there any contact between the Government and the Judge presiding over the trial of the assassins, in regard of newspaper coverage.”
From “Making Sense of the Troubles”, J. McCrittrick (Blackstaff, 1999)
The Government's immediate reaction to the hunger strike was to ignore it. A D-Notice was circulated to the media concerning the reporting of “activities by terrorist organisations” and it was made clear to the newspapers and the BBC that any coverage of the hunger strikes whatsoever would be frowned upon. As a result the majority of the media ignored the strikes totally, with only brief coverage appearing in the Guardian.
Meanwhile, despite Powell's claims that the strikes were an internal matter for the prison service, Molyneaux took a direct interest in how the prison service dealt with the hunger strikers. As an initial measure the hunger strikers were isolated in the prison hospital, in an attempt to prevent other IRA prisoners from smuggling out information about the protest. A vigil outside Long Kesh was swiftly dispersed by the police. Coverage in the Irish media, and increasing unrest in Ulster gradually rose however as October progressed.
On the 15th October, three Irish TDs attempted to visit the hunger strikers. They were refused permission. A Government spokesman dismissed the request with a sharply worded statement saying “We consider it an outrage that citizens of a foreign country should think it acceptable to come to the United Kingdom and demand to meet with the Government to discuss the internal policy of the sovereign British Government. This is an internal matter for HM Prison Service and one that will not be discussed with the representatives of a foreign regime.” For the first time this brought widespread coverage in the Irish media (although the media in the United Kingdom remained silent) and the British Government began increasing the number of troops in Ulster, in preparation for any violence. Overnight an extra 3,500 troops were sent to Northern Ireland.
On the 16th the Government again acted to separate the hunger strikers from their supporters. The Government issued orders for the closure of Long Kesh, and the dispersal of paramilitary prisoners throughout the mainland prison system. The plans were not publicly announced, but reached the inmates of Long Kesh at around 4pm and resulted in a prison riot. The riot destroyed much of the accommodation at Long Kesh and the security services used tear gas and plastic bullets to put it down. It has been subsequently claimed that this was a Government plan that misfired — the original intention was for riot to have been provoked and the Long Kesh camp shut down as a result of the damage caused, the muted coverage in the British press certainly portrayed the decision in this light. Overnight there was rioting in Derry and Belfast, and several security posts were firebombed. The British Government continued to transport troops into Northern Ireland.
On the 17th October the inmates of Long Kesh began to be transferred to the mainland. The four hunger strikers were transferred in secret to Long Sutton and Wakefield prisons, where the prison service instigated a programme of force-feeding. There was continuing violence across the province. Riots in Lagan and Belfast were put down by the army. In Derry IRA brigades effectively seized control of the “Free Derry” area. Two gun battles in South Armagh and Castlewellan resulted in the deaths of 15 IRA volunteers and the deaths of 8 British soldiers. Meanwhile the “Ulster Defence Council” announced it would mobilise men to protect Protestant areas in the event of civil war erupting.
The hunger strikes were again raised, and dismissed, at Prime Minister's Question Time on the 18th. Coverage in the British newspapers was still scarce, but the Irish media was saturated with coverage. Only an attempted assassinated bid on President Ford prevented the increasing violence reaching the newspapers in the USA.
From the Irish Times, 20th October 1975, “Molyneaux Announces Security Crackdown”
The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Mr James Molyneaux, announced a harsh new package of security measures yesterday in an attempt to stem the growing tide of violence that has threatened to engulf the province in the past week. Mr Molyneaux announced a further 4,000 British troops would be sent into Northern Ireland under the command of the newly appointed Director of Security in Northern Ireland, Sir Timothy Creasey. Lt General Creasey will have full responsibility for security arrangements in Northern Ireland, including the RUC, and his appointment marks a significant increase in the role of the armed forces in Ulster. Mr Molyneaux has also authorised the introduction of curfew orders, the reintroduction of internment and has announced the British Government's intention to negotiate with the Irish Government for permission to pursue terrorist suspects across the Irish border. Mr Molyneaux said he would make further announcements on the future of the province next week.
There was continued violence on the streets of Belfast last night, as armed loyalists clashed with IRA paramilitaries. Meanwhile on the British mainland there three IRA prisoners have been murdered in Woodhill prison. Unofficially prison officials in the UK are said to be concerned over the security implications of holding paramilitary prisoners in mainstream prisons. In further developments it has been reported that the IRA have called off their hunger strike.
From An Phoblacht, 20th October 1975, “British terror campaign continues”
The British terror campaign in the Six Counties claimed another victim
yesterday when IRA volunteer Gerry Adams, 27, was murdered by a loyalist death
squad, in collusion with British security forces. The appointment by the Brits
of Sir Timothy “Malay” Creasey, a veteran of harsh counter-insurgency campaigns
in Oman and Kenya suggests there is worse to come.
From “Making Sense of the Troubles”, J. McCrittrick (Blackstaff, 1999)
The new Conservative policy towards Ulster came in two parts. As well as
increasingly harsh security measures, Molyneaux announced an increase in
funding for social programmes in Northern Ireland to the sum of 350 million.
The initial welcome this received from both communities faltered when it
became clear that the vast majority of the funds would be spent on "slum
clearance“ programmes. There were suspicions that the ”slum clearance" would
amount to little more than the breaking up of traditional Catholic communities
in Northern Ireland, and despite the increased security arrangements and the
re-introduction of internment the last two months of 1975 saw continued
violence. Fourteen British soldiers were killed in November and December; 13
IRA paramilitaries and 9 nationalist politicians were killed by loyalist gunmen;
18 civilians were killed in riots in Belfast; four bombs were detonated on the
British mainland, killing 7 people. On the second of January 1976 an extra
4,000 troops were sent to Northern Ireland. On the eighth Molyneaux announced
the details of the first wave of the slum clearance programme. It would be the
light that ignited the powder keg of Northern Ireland.
From “Why so Many Errors? The Road to Civil War in Ulster” by S. McCartney, Journal of Conflict Studies (Spring 1998)
...for many in the nationalist community of course, the question of why the
British Government adopted such a harsh attitude towards the hunger strikers
and introduced the policy of “slum clearance” is no mystery. The British
Government wished to provoke a confrontation in order to justify extreme
security measures. It is an argument that has been consistently dismissed as a
paranoid conspiracy theory by the British Government, but one that, with the
wisdom of hindsight, is eternally attractive.