2026-11-18 - The NIS baseline security measures: uniform requirements and risk assessment
Fifth article in the
series NIS2 in Italy, beyond the deadlines
, introduced in the
first article on the method for reading the sources
. Sources updated as of 24 October 2026.
The baseline measures call for multi-factor authentication. On all systems? The answer of the Italian rules is more nuanced than the requirement suggests. The requirement applies at least to the relevant network and information systems, in accordance with the outcomes of the risk assessment. The Agency’s reading guide gives the example of an isolated system, protected by physical access controls, for which the risk assessment could conclude that the risk remains acceptable even without multi-factor authentication.
The example contains the whole logic of the baseline measures. A list of common requirements, worded prescriptively, and a series of clauses that give back to the entity a space for assessment, provided that the assessment is carried out and documented.
The question of this article is: which conception of security emerges from these rules? The thesis is that the baseline specifications achieve a compromise between uniformity and proportionality, and that the compromise shifts the centre of gravity of compliance onto the entity’s risk assessment.
The principle: appropriateness and proportionality
Article 21 of
requires appropriate and proportionate technical, operational and organisational measures. The measures must ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks posed, taking into account the state of the art, European and international standards and the cost of implementation. Proportionality is measured against the degree of exposure to risk, the size of the entity and the likelihood and severity of incidents. The measures follow an all-hazards approach and include at least ten elements, from risk analysis to cryptography, from the supply chain to multi-factor authentication.
Article 24 of
Legislative Decree No. 138 of 4 September 2024 (NIS Decree)
reproduces the framework. Article 31 adds a decisive step: it is the National Cybersecurity Agency (ACN) that establishes proportionate obligations and sets their deadlines, arrangements, specifications and phasing, differentiating them by category of relevance of the activities and services, by sector and type of entity, and according to the qualification as essential or important. In the initial application phase, Article 42 allowed it to establish baseline arrangements and specifications.
Proportionality, therefore, is not entrusted solely to the entity. It is in part predetermined by the Authority.
The baseline specifications
, applicable from 15 January 2026, adopts the baseline security measures in Annexes 1, for important entities, and 2, for essential entities. The measures are built on the National Framework for Cybersecurity and Data Protection, 2025 edition, and are organised into functions, categories, subcategories and requirements.
According to the
, there are 37 measures with 87 requirements for important entities and 43 with 116 requirements for essential entities. Twenty-seven measures are identical for the two categories, ten have additional requirements for essential entities, six apply only to essential entities.
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FunctionScopeMeasures, importantMeasures, essential
Govern (GV)Context, risk management strategy, roles, policies, supply chain1111
Identify (ID)Asset management, risk assessment, improvement and plans910
Protect (PR)Identity and access, training, data security, platforms, infrastructure resilience1216
Detect (DE)Continuous monitoring22
Respond (RS)Incident management and communication22
Recover (RC)Recovery execution and communication12
Total3743
Count of measures by function carried out on Annexes 1 and 2 to ACN Determination 379907/2025; the totals match those indicated by the reading guide.
Two features emerge from reading the Annexes. The requirements are predominantly organisational, as the guide itself acknowledges: policies, plans, procedures, roles, registers. And the adoption of the measures, according to FAQ MSB.6, means the implementation of all the requirements provided for, not of a part of them.
Four clauses that reopen the assessment
If the Annexes stopped at the requirements, the system would be a uniform list. The reading guide, however, identifies four clauses through which the risk-based approach has been translated into the requirements.
- “For at least the relevant network and information systems”. The entity may limit the requirement to the systems whose compromise would have a significant impact on the activities and services for which it is a NIS entity. The clause appears in 13 requirements for important entities and 22 for essential entities; it presupposes the list of relevant systems required by measure GV.OC-04.
- “In accordance with the outcomes of the risk assessment”. The arrangements and scope of implementation of the requirement depend on the assessment carried out pursuant to measure ID.RA-05. It is present in 6 requirements for important entities and 10 for essential entities.
- “Without prejudice to reasoned and documented regulatory or technical grounds”. The entity may derogate if legal or technical constraints prevent implementation, but must document them, adopt compensating measures where applicable and record in the risk treatment plan the measures and the residual risk. The guide cites medical devices, on which the installation of an endpoint protection system could invalidate the certification. It concerns 8 requirements for important entities and 10 for essential entities.
- “Supplies with potential impacts on the security of network and information systems”. The entity may limit the supply chain requirements to the supplies whose compromise may affect the security of the systems. It occurs in 3 requirements for both categories.
The clauses combine in cascade. Where a requirement contains both, it applies at least to the relevant systems for which the risk assessment requires its implementation.
The same scheme applies to the artificial intelligence systems that a NIS entity uses in the activities or services for which it is subject to the rules. If their compromise would have a significant impact on those activities, they fall within the relevant network and information systems, and the baseline measures apply to them too, from identity and access management to the supply chain. Article 15 of the AI Act,
, lays down accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity requirements for high-risk systems only: they are requirements of the system, borne by the provider, that is, whoever develops it and places it on the market or puts it into service under its own name, and they do not replace the organisational and technical measures that the NIS entity must adopt on its own systems.
The resulting conception of security
In my view, the design of the baseline specifications reveals a precise choice. The Agency did not leave to the entities the task of translating Article 24 into concrete measures by themselves, as a purely risk-based reading would have allowed. It set a common list of requirements, differentiated only between essential and important entities, and concentrated the risk assessment at specific points, where the entity may modulate the scope or the arrangements for implementation.
The compromise has a consequence that goes beyond the individual requirements. Each clause rests on a precondition of its own: the first on the list of relevant systems required by measure GV.OC-04, the second on the outcomes of the risk assessment carried out pursuant to measure ID.RA-05, the third on the documentation of the constraints and on the recording, in the treatment plan, of the compensating measures and the residual risk, the fourth on the nature of the supply. The guide does not state a general rule for the case in which these preconditions are missing. In my view, the consequence is nonetheless clear: a modulation of the scope or of the arrangements for implementation that is not reflected in the document justifying it cannot be demonstrated in supervisory proceedings, and the entity exposes itself to a challenge on the requirement in its full wording. The risk assessment, which in the Directive is the principle, in the baseline specifications becomes the condition for demonstrating proportionality.
There is also a limit. The baseline specifications distinguish between essential and important entities, not yet between activities and services according to their relevance. This second differentiation is entrusted to the future long-term measures, which will have to be based on the categorisation of activities and services. I will deal with it in the article on categorisation.
The deadlines, by cohort
No single date applies to everyone.
- For entities included in the list in 2025, the deadline for adopting the measures is eighteen months from receipt of the notice of inclusion (Determination 379907/2025, Article 3). The guide indicates that the notices were sent from 12 April 2025 onwards; for this cohort the
places the deadline in October 2026.
- For entities included for the first time in 2026, the deadline is 31 July 2027 (
, Article 1).
- Operators of essential services already identified and larger electronic communications operators maintain, on the systems concerned, the measures already adopted under the previous rules (Determination 379907/2025, Articles 5 and 6).
- For systems included in the national cybersecurity perimeter, the provisions of the NIS Decree do not apply (Decree, Article 33).
A practical clarification, contained in FAQ MSB.12, concerns supply contracts: the security requirements must be included in contracts concluded, renewed or extended from the deadline for adopting the measures onwards, without prejudice to reasoned and documented regulatory or technical grounds, with no obligation to adapt those already in progress beforehand.
The relationship with Implementing Regulation 2024/2690
For certain categories of digital providers, the Directive entrusted the Commission with defining the technical and methodological requirements of the measures.
Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690
applies to the entities listed in Article 1: DNS service providers, top-level domain name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers and managed security service providers, online marketplaces, search engines, social networking platforms and trust service providers. For all other NIS entities the Regulation is not applicable; the
that accompanies it can serve as a methodological reference, not as a compliance benchmark.
Open question. For the entities under Article 1, the European Regulation is directly applicable and also defines, in Article 3, its own criteria for the significance of incidents. The same entities are addressees of the national baseline specifications. In the Agency’s documents consulted for this article I have not found an explicit link between the two levels. The Regulation is binding in its entirety and directly applicable, hence it prevails over the national specifications in the event of conflict. Direct applicability does not, however, by itself exclude the coexistence of compatible national requirements on the same aspects: the Directive is one of minimum harmonisation and allows Member States provisions ensuring a higher level of security, provided they are consistent with Union law (Article 5). In my view, the problem is not one of wholesale precedence but of specific coordination, requirement by requirement, between two texts that overlap without referring to each other; a clarification from the Authority would reduce a concrete uncertainty. The proposal to amend the Directive presented by the Commission in January 2026 intervenes precisely on this point, introducing maximum harmonisation for the implementing acts adopted pursuant to Article 21(5): it is a proposal, not law in force, which I will examine in the final article in the series.
Final remarks
The October 2026 deadline is the eighteen-month deadline for entities included in the list in 2025; the initial application phase in the technical sense, that of Article 42 of the Decree, ended on 31 December 2025, and for entities included in 2026 the deadline for the measures is 31 July 2027. None of these dates closes the question of compliance. The baseline measures are a common minimum threshold; the long-term measures announced by the Agency will introduce more advanced requirements, differentiated by category of relevance.
In my view, the most correct way to read the baseline specifications is not as a checklist, but as a system in which proportionality choices are allowed only if reasoned. This is what makes the risk assessment a legally relevant document, and not merely a technical one.
Practical guidance. The critical point is the consistency between the risk assessment, the list of relevant systems and the treatment plan; one mistake to avoid is to invoke the modulation clauses without the assessment that should justify them having been carried out, approved and documented.
Reference documents
European Union
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), Articles 5 and 21:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj
- Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2024/2690/oj
- Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (AI Act), Article 15:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj
- ENISA, NIS2 Technical Implementation Guidance:
Italy
- Legislative Decree No. 138 of 4 September 2024, Article 24:
- Legislative Decree No. 138 of 4 September 2024, Article 31:
- ACN Determination 379907/2025:
- Annex 1 (important entities):
- Annex 2 (essential entities):
- ACN Determination 127434/2026:
- ACN, reading guide to the baseline specifications:
- ACN, FAQs on security measures and incident notification:
- ACN, NIS Vademecum:
This article is for general information purposes and does not constitute legal advice. The framework is updated as of 24 October 2026; the scope of application of the individual requirements depends on the qualification and on the risk assessment of each entity.
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